Shadow Banking in China - Implications of Defaults

While informal lending is significant, it is not big enough to bring down the entire system.

Trends:

  • Informal lending, or shadow banking, has become very active across China since earlier this year
  • It has recently caught both media and government attention after multiple cases of “underground trust” went burst
  • The situation is worst in Wenzhou, where a number of business owners have gone into hiding or even committed suicide

Drivers:

  • A credit tightening policy was implemented by People’s Bank of China in early 2011
  • The state-owned banks prefer to lend to state-owned enterprises and large private companies, leaving little credit available to SMEs
  • Negative real interest rate and lack of investment choices prompt people to seek a higher return through informal lending

Implications:

  • The non-performing loan ratio is going to rise during any economic slowdown, triggering defaults among informal lending entities, many of which are ponzi schemes
  • The most risky form of informal lending is curb market lending, where many uninformed individuals and small companies will put money together to lend to highly risky or even “phantom” projects with virtually no due diligence
  • The informal lending market is estimated to be one-fifth the size of the total loan market, while the curb market lending is about 1/3 of total informal lending. While these numbers are significant, they are not big enough to bring down the entire system

Industry Reform in China

The following is a cross post from the Silicon Hutong blog. The blog is written by Frontier Strategy Group Beijing-based expert adviser David Wolf.

In a characteristically articulate editorial last week, Caixin called for an extensive overhaul of China’s Ministry of Railways (MoR) in the wake of the high-speed train crash in Wenzhou on July 23rd. The publication called for an open investigation into the accident conducted by experts from outside the control or influence of the MoR, for the functions of railway development, construction, operation, and regulation to be divided among independent entities, and for the folding of the resulting regulator into a larger ministry with a purview over the wider transport sector.

These changes are not without precedent in China. Aviation went through a similar change in the early 1990s, the telecommunications sector was similarly reformed five years later, and the energy sector has gone through a series of reforms that have separated the regulatory function from the business of generating and distributing energy. There are so many examples of where this has happened, in fact, that not only is the MoR something of a relic of China’s pre-reforming-and-opening past, it is also a matter of suggestive speculation as to why the MoR was left alone for so long.

So this sort of reform is overdue, and it looks like the higher organs of the Chinese government will try to unravel the hairball of conflicts-of-interest and mismanagement that serve as China’s railway industry.

Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?

Unfortunately, even the measures suggested in Ciaxin’s excellent piece will not be enough. The world is replete with examples of industry-specific regulators who have become intertwined with – and co-opted by – the very industries they were created to regulate. One need look no further than the U.S. financial industry and its relationship with the Federal Reserve, the Department of the Treasury, and the Securities and Exchange commission to find proof, and there are ample additional examples.

The lesson of history is that regulators are most effective when they themselves are watched from the outside. While Caixin’s editors would be too modest (or timid) to say so, it is Caixin and all of the others who are watching the regulators from the outside who provide the best guarantee of a better and safer railway system for China.